No Need for Black Chambers: Testing TLS in the E-mail Ecosystem at Large by Mayer, Wilfried et al.
No Need for Black Chambers: Testing TLS in the
E-mail Ecosystem at Large
Wilfried Mayer∗, Aaron Zauner∗, Martin Schmiedecker∗ and Markus Huber†
∗SBA Research, Austria
{wmayer|azauner|mschmiedecker}@sba-research.org
†FH St. Po¨lten, Austria
markus.huber@fhstp.ac.at
Abstract—TLS is the most widely used cryptographic protocol
on the Internet. While many recent studies focused on its use
in HTTPS, none so far analyzed TLS usage in e-mail related
protocols, which often carry highly sensitive information. Since
end-to-end encryption mechanisms like PGP are seldomly used,
today confidentiality in the e-mail ecosystem is mainly based on
the encryption of the transport layer. A well-positioned attacker
may be able to intercept plaintext passively and at global scale.
In this paper we are the first to present a scalable method-
ology to assess the state of security mechanisms in the e-mail
ecosystem using commodity hardware and open-source software.
We draw a comprehensive picture of the current state of every
e-mail related TLS configuration for the entire IPv4 range. We
collected and scanned a massive data-set of 20 million IP/port
combinations of all related protocols (SMTP, POP3, IMAP) and
legacy ports. Over a time span of approx. three months we
conducted more than 10 billion TLS handshakes. Additionally,
we show that securing server-to-server communication using
e.g. SMTP is inherently more difficult than securing client-to-
server communication. Lastly, we analyze the volatility of TLS
certificates and trust anchors in the e-mail ecosystem and argue
that while the overall trend points in the right direction, there
are still many steps needed towards secure e-mail.
I. INTRODUCTION
E-mail has become one of the most fundamental and
important services of the Internet and is used by more than a
billion users every day. While the implementations and the
underlying protocols have (for the most part) endured the test
of time, there is no way for users to assess the security and
confidentiality of e-mails in transit. Even if the client-to-server
connection is secured, server-to-server communication relies
on plaintext communication as fallback leaving a large fraction
of transmitted e-mails unencrypted and not authenticated.
This is a serious limitation, as they are passively observable
along the transmission path and users are left in the dark
whether their e-mails will be transmitted between servers in
plaintext or not. While the advent of opportunistic encryption
is good from the privacy viewpoint, it offers no protection
against active attackers. Recent data from Google shows that
approximately 45% of inbound and 20% of outbound e-mail
are transmitted in plaintext [33] at the time of writing. While
PGP would protect e-mails from end to end, its adoption is
marginal. Numerous attackers, ranging from local attackers
who are able to sniff or modify WiFi traffic, to customer as
well as transit ISPs up to nation states are thus able to not only
read e-mails in massive quantities, but also to modify, delay
or delete them at will. If somehow the usage of TLS between
all links during e-mail transit could be enforced, this would
not only provide authentication but also confidentiality thanks
to the use of encryption. However, due to the decentralized
nature of e-mail there is no way to upgrade all servers or
somehow enforce link encryption. In fact, we are still just
beginning to understand the consequences of large fractions
of e-mails being transmitted unencrypted.
In this paper we are the first to present a methodology to
assess the overall availability of cryptographic primitives for
e-mail at scale. While many of the problems of e-mail are
connected to the design of popular e-mail protocols, we are
the first to quantify and evaluate the adoption of well-known
security primitives on a large scale, namely the support of
TLS1 for e-mail protocols on the Internet. Previous large-scale
studies on usage and prevalence of TLS focused either on the
protocol itself or its usage and implications for secure web
browsing using HTTPS. As such, we are the first to present
our findings on TLS usage and deployment in e-mail protocols
using active probing, with overall more than ten billion TLS
handshakes conducted. In particular, the contributions of this
paper are as follows:
• We conducted IPv4-wide scans on a number of im-
portant ports for e-mail regarding TLS, providing a
holistic measurement on e-mail transport layer secu-
rity.
• We compare the results with previous work on
HTTPS, and find that TLS in e-mail is inherently less
secure.
• We analyze the quality and distribution of supported
ciphers, arguing that it’s still a long way to secure
e-mail transport.
• We model the graph of all TLS-enabled SMTP servers
and find that it is much more complicated to eradicate
plaintext and insecure cipher suites then with other
protocols.
• We evaluate openly available Internet-wide certificate
information for TLS in e-mail over a 6-month period.
1In this paper we use the term TLS to refer to all incarnations of the TLS
and SSL protocols, if not specified otherwise.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II gives a brief introduction to TLS and how it is used
in e-mail protocols. In Section III we describe our scanning
methodology as well as the different inputs we used for
seeding our scanning activity. Section IV presents our results
of multiple months of scanning activity, while Section V is
on the problem of insecure ciphers and plaintext in SMTP.
Section VI discusses our findings, interprets the results and
compares them with other protocols that use TLS. Section VII
discusses mitigation strategies and methods how the overall
security for e-mail can be increased. Section VIII discusses
related work, before we conclude in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
Today Transport Layer Security (TLS) serves as the
underlying foundation for securing many of the most widely
used protocols on the Internet, including HTTP and e-mail.
TLS provides confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of
data transferred on the wire. A general overview of TLS, and
more specifically on its usage in HTTPS are given in [58],
[13]. In recent years the TLS protocol and specific software
implementations of the protocol have been under close
scrutiny by security researchers, and numerous attacks have
been discovered with names like BEAST [20], POODLE [53],
CRIME [59], BREACH [32] or Lucky13 [3] which attack
the incorrect usage of block cipher modes, compression and
shortcomings in specific versions of TLS. RFC 7457 [41]
provides a good overview of known attacks against TLS.
Heartbleed [23] on the other hand was a devastating bug in
OpenSSL which allowed attackers to read content from the
server process’ heap memory, including login credentials and
the private key used by the server. MS14-066 [52] (dubbed
“Winshock”) allowed a remote attacker code execution on a
system by supplying a malicious ECDSA certificate during
the handshake. Other papers analyzed, at large, the unsound
use of cryptographic primitives like the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange parameters [2] or problematic issues with
RC4 [4] or RSA in TLS [62], [36], [49]. Lastly it was shown
that specific implementations were vulnerable to numerous
timing-based side channel attacks [51]. Other publications
had a special focus on the usage of TLS on smartphone
apps as well as other non-browser software [28], [31], [29],
[34]. Formal verification of TLS is another research area
which received an increased momentum [7], [8] as well as
the verified implementation of the TLS protocol [11], [9], [45].
The e-mail ecosystem makes use of numerous ports and
protocols for transmission: SMTP is used for transmitting e-
mails between servers, and runs usually over TCP port 25 [46],
[38]. Clients use either the IMAP4 or POP3 protocols to
retrieve e-mails from a message delivery server, and SMTP
for e-mail submission. IMAP uses TCP ports 143 or 993 [55],
[56], POP3 uses TCP ports 110 or 995 [14], [56], and SMTP
Message Submission runs on TCP port 25, 587 [30] or 465.
Although IANA revoked the usage of port 465 for SMTPS
in 1998, it is still heavily used for this purpose. All client-
facing protocols are available on two different TCP ports
because there are two distinct ways to establish a TLS session:
implicit TLS where the connection is established with a
TLS handshake, and in-band upgrade of the used plaintext
protocol via STARTTLS. Table I shows an overview of the
Fig. 1. Typical e-mail flow on the Internet from submission to delivery
via multiple hops. MSA: Mail Submission Agent, MTA: Mail Transfer Agent,
MDA: Mail Delivery Agent.
Port TLS Protocol Usage
25 STARTTLS SMTP E-mail transmission
110 STARTTLS POP3 E-mail retrieval
143 STARTTLS IMAP E-mail retrieval
465 implicit SMTPS E-mail submission
587 STARTTLS SMTP E-mail submission
993 implicit IMAPS E-mail retrieval
995 implicit POP3S E-mail retrieval
TABLE I. COMMON PORTS USED FOR E-MAIL
commonly used ports for e-mails, including which primitive
is used for securing the transport. The complete path an e-
mail takes is shown in Figure 1: submitted by the client to the
mail submission agent (MSA), the e-mail passes an arbitrary
number of relaying mail transfer agent (MTA) servers before it
finally reaches the recipient’s MTA. Note that the user is only
able use or enforce TLS on the edge of this path - she has no
control or knowledge whether the MSA or mail delivery agent
(MDA) communicate using TLS, or if the MTAs in between
make use of it.
A. TLS handshake and STARTTLS
To initiate a TLS encrypted connection, a TLS hand-
shake is necessary. A “PreMasterSecret” is established with
a ClientKeyExchange message which is then encrypted
using the public key of the server certificate. Client and
Server use the “PreMasterSecret” together with random num-
bers (usually a timestamp and random bytes) to establish
a common “MasterSecret”. During this handshake a spe-
cific cipher suite is negotiated with ChangeCipherSpec
messages. A cipher suite is represented by a two byte
value and determines the cryptographic primitives to be used
in the connection [16], [12]. It consists of methods for
the key exchange, encryption and message authentication.
For example TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
(IANA assigned values: 0x00, 0x16) is the cipher suite
combining an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange with
RSA authentication, 3DES in EDE-CBC mode for encryption
and SHA-1 for message authentication (HMAC). Historically,
TLS implementations used their own nomenclature for cipher
2
suites as IANA only standardized TLS parameters in 20062
with the introduction of TLS 1.1. Figure 2 illustrates a standard
in-band TLS handshake (STARTTLS) in the context of SMTP.
The flow of STARTTLS messages is specific to the under-
lying protocol to be secured and not a general way for in-band
upgrade. Different RFCs [38], [56] specify these details.
The term “opportunistic encryption” [19] is commonly
used when referring to TLS in e-mail protocols. Opportunistic
encryption means that connections are usually not authenti-
cated (certificates not validated) and are vulnerable to an active
attacker but enable more wide-spread use and deployment
of security protocols like TLS and efficiently secure against
passive adversaries.
Fig. 2. Example of establishing a secured SMTP connection with STARTTLS
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the source of our input data,
the methodology and tools we used, and our considerations
regarding the impact of our scans. In the beginning we started
with the following requirements: the performance of our
methodology should be sufficient in that it runs on commodity
hardware with a fast Internet connection. Our goal was to
scan more than a million hosts in less than a week, with
low additional load for the target systems. Handling network
2https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml
connections is what these systems do (by design), and we
took specific precautions that our connections would have no
negative impact on the performance or operations. Furthermore
our scans should be complete, as in all cipher suites should be
covered as well as all the important TLS parameters should
be collected i.e. certificates, the certificate chain up to the root
CA which signed the certificate, RSA primes and DH-group.
For our evaluation we wanted to cover all seven ports which
are used by default for e-mail.
A. Input data-set
The source of our scan consists of a list of all input IP
addresses together with the application-specific TCP port.
Of course not all IPv4 addresses support an application or
even accept incoming data on an application-specific port.
We therefore would have to conduct a regular port scan. With
the introduction of zmap [24] and similar tools, IPv4-wide
port scans can be accomplished quite fast. Many results
of port scans are publicly available on a short-term basis,
so we decided to use existing datasets from scans.io3 as a
source for our cipher suite scans. The ”Full IPv4 Banner
Grab and StartTLS” and the ”Full IPv4 TLS Handshake
and Banner Grab” datasets from the University of Michigan
and the Project Sonar Study (Port 465) from Rapid7 Labs
consist of all addressable IPv4 hosts which completed a full
TLS handshake at a given time. We used results originating
from March to April 2015 as the initial set of IPs for our
scans. To further tighten the set of input addresses, we only
selected hosts which completed the TLS handshake without
any error by filtering the included error key. This resulted in
18,430,143 IP/port combinations which were used for our scan.
In June 2015 we verified these IP/port combinations with
the results of banner grabbing and certificate collection scans
performed with masscan4 by our own team. This tool is using
asynchronous connections, its own custom user-land TCP/IP
stack and other approaches to speed up IP-address and port
enumeration. It can also establish a TCP connection to a target
system afterwards for e.g. banner collection. This scan resulted
in 23,367,809 possible IP/port combinations. Nearly 70% of
these combinations were already included in our initial input
data. Because no existing scan for SMTP Port 587 (client-
facing message submission) was publicly available, we used
the results of a masscan run for input to an additional cipher
suite scan on port 587 in June 2015. To allow observations
based on the domain of a host, we also scanned MX records
for all domains listed in the Alexa Top 1 Million ranking. We
stored these records together with the resolved IP addresses to
allow the interpretation of our scan result with the popularity of
a domain, and to combine them with the Google Transparency
Report on safer e-mail [33].
B. Scanning the Cipher Suite Support
The specification of the TLS handshake protocol [18]
requires that the client specifies a set of supported cipher suites
in the ClientHello handshake message and the server then
picks a specific one of them. So the client has to initiate more
3https://scans.io
4https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
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than one handshake to determine which set of cipher suites
for a specific TLS version a server exactly accepts or rejects.
The simplest algorithm is to test each cipher suite individually
by offering exactly one cipher suite per ClientHello.
The response is either a ServerHello or Alert message
which can be interpreted as an accepted or rejected cipher
suite. We used the tool sslyze5 to perform this type of scan. It
is a plugin based tool written in Python, built around a custom
OpenSSL wrapper. The plugin “PluginOpenSSLCipherSuites”
was used to test a specific set of cipher suites. Seven different
cipher suites were tested for SSLv2 and 136 cipher suites for
SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 each. This deliberately
also includes combinations of TLS version and cipher suite
which are not specified in the corresponding RFCs and thus
violate the standard e.g. SSLv3 with ECDHE cipher suites. In
total we established at least 551 connections per IP to fully
test the supported cipher suites for each IP/port combination.
We stored the acceptance status as either accepted, rejected,
preferred or error. If the handshake was successful we also
stored key exchange parameters for the Diffie-Hellman key
exchanges. In the case that the TLS connections were not
successful, we stored the alert message or error reason given.
Additionally we stored the complete certificate chain per IP.
To optimize sslyze for our needs we made certain changes.
sslyze was written as a command line tool. To use it efficiently
with millions of possible targets we embedded the tool into
a distributed environment and integrated it with a queuing
system (AMQP). As such our methodology can be easily
used in a distributed environment, with many simultaneous
hosts that perform scanning activity working together on an
input list of IPs to be scanned. We deliberately did not try to
hide our scans, and decided to scan the hosts from one host
only. We only used one IP for the scans (Ubuntu Linux 14.04,
Intel Core i7, 4x 3.10 GHz, 32GB DDR3 RAM, 100MBit/s
Network Bandwidth). We consider our results to be a lower
bound for assessing the usage of TLS in e-mail, and the
scan time can easily be decreased by adding more hosts or
bandwidth. Other hosts were used for postprocessing.
sslyze scans all cipher suites on a per host/port basis, and
thus fullfils our requirements listed above. All cipher suite tests
are queued consecutive within one process. It then maximizes
parallelization by using 15 threads per process and by using
more than one process. This intense scan behavior may be
seen as a Denial-of-Service attack and may disrupt normal
service behavior because all connection attempts are started
in a very short timeframe. To solve this issue, we had to
spread the cipher suite tests over time. Also, the availability
of hosts may change during a scan, which can increase the
chance of incomplete results due to hosts that go offline during
that timeframe. We therefore serialized the behavior of the
scan, spreading the total scan time to several minutes for one
host/port, and increased the total number of scan processes.
This yielded a good balance between minimizing the scanning
impact on the target systems to be scanned – as not all
connections are opened in direct succession – while completing
the entire list of cipher suites to be scanned in reasonable time.
With this methodology we were able to scan between 12,000
5https://github.com/nabla-c0d3/sslyze
and 30,000 IP/port combinations per hour. Our bottleneck
was identified to be the number of sockets provided by the
operating system, in particular the time until a socket can be
reused - spreading the load over multiple machines can easily
help to overcome this obstacle. After scanning was completed
for each port we transformed the output and analyzed it using
Google BigQuery6.
C. Ethical Issues
Similar to related work on active probing on the Internet,
we took specific measures to inform not only about our
intentions, but also about our scanning methodology and how
people can be excluded from future scans. On our scanning
host we served a simple webpage to inform about our scans,
both over HTTP and HTTPS. We furthermore created a
specific abuse address as single point of contact and included
it in the WHOIS abuse database. Lastly we set a reverse DNS
entry to identify us as a scanning host and to point to the
webpage. We were in direct contact with our upstream ISP’s
network administrators to answer complaints and inquiries and
made sure that all requests were answered in a timely manner.
To prevent connection- or resource-wise Denial of Service for
the hosts to be scanned, we tested our scanning methodology
on devices with constrained hardware, in addition to spreading
the number of connections over time. These devices were
limited in the overall computation resources. We choose them
to reflect, appropriately, the smallest possible devices on the
Internet that could be used to run a full e-mail stack, similar
to a very small cloud instance (VPS) or an embedded system
(router or appliances). We did not take any specific measures
to prevent our connections from being logged, and did not
take any measures to stay below the radar of vigilant system
administrators.
Overall, we received 89 e-mails on our abuse e-mail
address. 52 of them were automatically generated by IDS tools
to inform us that one of our hosts might be engaging in some
possibly unsolicited scanning activity and to investigate the
issue accordingly. 16 e-mails were simple blacklisting requests,
and the other e-mails were mostly driven by curiosity where
administrators wanted to know additional details on our scans
and in particular how their setup performed compared to the
rest. A few e-mails were just blatantly rude. Upon investigating
one of the complaints in depth it was discovered that there was
a bug in the dovecot mail server that caused a sub-process of
the software to crash7. This bug was fixed by the software
maintainers shortly after notification.
IV. EVALUATION
This section presents the data we obtained through our
scans. First we give a general overview on the datasets we
obtained. Next we evaluate the cipher suite acceptance and
cipher suite preference of the scanned hosts. We then take a
closer look at the accepted cryptographic primitives and the
parameters used in Diffie-Hellman key exchanges. Lastly we
present pressing problems with how TLS is used in related
e-mail protocols.
6https://cloud.google.com/bigquery/
7CVE-2015-3420
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In total we conducted 20,270,768 scans over seven different
TCP ports (Table II). The scans were performed between April
and August 2015. Thereof, 18,381,936 were valid results,
meaning that at least one TLS handshake was completed.
1,888,832 of the scans were invalid with no TLS session estab-
lished at all (77.9% Could not connect (timeout), 17.5% Con-
nection rejected, 3% SMTP EHLO rejected, 1.6% STARTTLS
rejected). Since we established 551 TLS handshakes with
different cipher suites and TLS versions per host and port, this
resulted in more than 10.2 billion TLS handshakes conducted.
89.78% of these handshakes got rejected, 8.26% accepted and
1.95% resulted in an error. The high percentage of rejected
ciphers is due to the fact that e-mail servers typically do not
support all TLS versions available between SSLv2 and TLS
1.2, and not every cipher suite for each supported TLS version.
A. Supported cipher suites
Table III shows the percentage of unique hosts that
support a specific TLS protocol version. A host supports
a TLS version if at least one handshake with any chosen
cipher suite for this version is accepted by the server. SMTP
is remarkable in that it has a relatively large acceptance of
SSLv2 and SSLv3. The support of SSLv2 for client-to-server
connections is generally low, except for e-mail submission
on port 587 where 15% of all tested IPs accept cipher suites
from SSLv2. TLSv1 is with more than 90% clearly the most
supported version for all studied e-mail protocols. This means
that 9 out of 10 e-mail servers that speak TLS can use TLSv1,
whereas approximately 50–66% accept the newer versions
TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
Table III shows the percentages of exclusive TLS version
subsets. Hosts that support only TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 are
close to non-existing across all protocols and SMTP on port
25 using exclusively other TLS version combinations as listed
in the table. It also shows some TLS version support for
combinations of interest e.g, SSLv2 and SSLv3 without any
support for TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 (which is close
to non-existing) or modern configurations without support of
SSLv2 or SSLv3 is deployed by up to one third of all hosts
for mail delivery protocols. Only 8% of all SMTP hosts have
this configuration.
In Table IV we show the acceptance rate of selected cipher
suites for TLSv1 (as it is by far the most supported version of
TLS across all protocols).
For many cipher suites we can identify a big gap in the
acceptance rate of weak cipher suites for SMTP and client
protocols. E.g., DES-CBC-SHA is only supported by 6% of all
IMAP and POP hosts, but 75% of SMTP hosts. The percentage
for submission lies at 29%. To better understand these results,
we cluster the cryptographic primitives of all accepted cipher
suites in the next subsection.
To test preferred cipher suites, we specified a set of cipher
suites in the ClientHello message. cipher suites with
CAMELLIA and 3DES encryption were not considered due
to a bug in some already deployed versions of libssl8. Table V
shows how often a specific cipher suite was chosen. 44%
8https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=665452
of all SMTP deployments prefer the ECDHE-RSA-AES256-
SHA cipher suite over DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA. Static RSA
key exchange with AES256-SHA is only preferred by 5%.
For all other protocols 60–80% of all hosts prefer DHE-RSA-
AES256-SHA over its counterpart with ECDHE or static RSA.
B. Cryptographic primitives
Table VI compares the different percentages of key ex-
change methods used. Static RSA is supported by the majority
of hosts. 15%-17% of POP3 and IMAP deployments use static
RSA as the only key exchange algorithm. Just a few (7–9%) of
all POP3 and IMAP hosts offer ECDHE for key exchange, but
close to 75% support DHE as key exchange mechanism. Both
methods guarantee perfect forward secrecy. A high number
of deployments accept weak anonymous Diffie-Hellman and
export grade handshakes.
Table VII presents the percentage of hosts that support an
encryption method with given key size. 3DES and AES in
CBC mode are currently the most widely adopted encryption
methods. Because of several weaknesses [4] the use of RC4 in
TLS was prohibited in February 2015 [57]. We observe that
it is still widely supported by 82.3% to 86.5% of all hosts.
However, less than 0.9% exclusively support RC4. AES in
GCM is supported by 49.2% to 63.3% hosts. Still 15–18%
of all hosts support export ciphers (DES-40, RC4-40, RC2-
40) for POP3 and IMAP, 73–75% for STMP and 28–30% for
submission.
C. Key Exchange Parameters
The recently discovered Logjam attack against TLS [2] was
possible because many servers employ weak Diffie-Hellman
parameters. We analyzed used group sizes, since 512 bit and
768 bit groups are considered very weak. Common used primes
are more valuable for precalculation attacks, so we tried to
uncover some of them.
1) Weak Diffie-Hellman parameters: We analyzed the use
of different Diffie-Hellman parameters and thereafter cate-
gorized all cipher suites into two sets: cipher suites with
export restricted algorithms and all other cipher suites. Because
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange for export cipher suites is
restricted to 512 bit, almost all use this size. For SMTP 12
hosts used a different group size, whereas 1,045,456 hosts
used the 512 bit group. For non-export cipher suites, 1024
bit parameters are clearly most commonly used. Still 6-7% of
POP3 and IMAP use 768 bit parameters. These parameters
will soon be deprecated in OpenSSL.9 2048 bit parameters
are rarely deployed and 4096 are close to non-existing. One
exception are parameters used on TCP port 465. 69.5% of all
hosts use a 2048 bit group and only 30.39% use a 1024 bit
group. We explain this difference with the default configuration
of Exim, a popular MTA daemon which uses a 2048 bit
DH group (2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order
Subgroup [50]) by default.
9https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2015/05/20/
logjam-freak-upcoming-changes/
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Port Protocol Source of Input Timeframe Total scans Valid results Invalid resuls Reoccured in masscan results (July)
25 SMTP with STARTTLS scans.io UMich 05/05 – 05/20 1,825,657 1,558,796 266,861 1,611,051
110 POP3 with STARTTLS scans.io UMich 05/20 – 06/04 4,123,819 3,553,201 570,618 3,572,513
143 IMAP with STARTTLS scans.io UMich 06/04 – 06/06 859,470 764,211 95,259 765,511
465 SMTP over TLS scans.io Rapid7 06/07 – 06/21 3,123,874 2,851,598 272,276 2,681,955
587 Submission with STARTTLS masscan results 07/27 – 08/03 1,840,629 1,656,901 183,728 -
993 IMAP over TLS scans.io UMich 04/27 – 05/05 4,254,564 4,047,385 207,179 3,897,348
995 POP3 over TLS scans.io UMich 04/17 – 04/27 4,242,755 3,949,844 292,911 3,775,292
Σ 20,270,768 18,381,936 1,888,832
TABLE II. OVERVIEW OF OUR SCAN RESULTS
TLS version 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
SSLv2 41.7% 2.9% 3.7% 4.2% 15.0% 8.7% 9.3%
SSLv3 82.6% 35.3% 38.6% 36.1% 64.0% 53.7% 53.8%
TLSv1 91.6% 98.9% 98.9% 94.8% 92.4% 98.2% 97.9%
TLSv1.1 55.7% 50.5% 54.1% 65.6% 49.6% 57.2% 55.1%
TLSv1.2 56.1% 50.7% 54.2% 65.2% 48.8% 57.7% 55.6%
only SSLv2&3 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
only TLSv1 1.6% 27.2% 23.1% 13.9% 10.6% 12.1% 12.6%
only TLSv1–1.2 8.0% 36.4% 37.2% 44.7% 17.9% 32.8% 31.9%
only SSLv3&TLSv1 7.0% 18.4% 19.1% 11.1% 21.1% 22.3% 22.9%
only TLSv1.1–1.2 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1%
TABLE III. PROTOCOL VERSION SUPPORT
cipher suite name (OpenSSL) 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
AES256-SHA 89.0% 91.5% 93.1% 92.8% 82.7% 89.4% 88.4%
CAMELLIA256-SHA 57.3% 54.4% 57.2% 65.3% 49.5% 55.3% 53.7%
DES-CBC-SHA 75.0% 5.9% 5.6% 6.7% 29.3% 6.1% 6.2%
DES-CBC3-SHA 89.4% 95.9% 97.1% 92.6% 90.8% 93.4% 93.1%
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 83.6% 72.0% 73.5% 85.4% 63.5% 72.5% 71.8%
IDEA-CBC-SHA 21.3% 45.0% 46.4% 46.0% 28.1% 45.3% 45.3%
SEED-SHA 52.8% 47.6% 49.8% 52.4% 35.3% 48.3% 47.2%
RC4-SHA 84.9% 85.1% 85.4% 81.6% 78.8% 81.7% 81.9%
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 39.8% 8.1% 8.4% 11.3% 24.1% 8.6% 7.0%
ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA 38.4% 6.0% 6.4% 10.4% 18.8% 6.5% 5.7%
EXP-RC4-MD5 72.7% 17.9% 16.4% 5.2% 28.0% 14.1% 14.0%
EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 72.4% 17.7% 16.2% 5.2% 27.7% 14.1% 14.0%
EXP-DES-CBC-SHA 72.7% 17.6% 16.1% 5.2% 27.7% 14.0% 13.9%
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED CIPHER SUITE ACCEPTANCE FOR TLSV1.
Version cipher suite 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
TLSv1 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 49.64% 68.03% 67.89% 79.32% 47.72% 68.39% 69.65%
TLSv1 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA 43.67% 6.44% 6.84% 11.49% 23.01% 7.43% 6.13%
TLSv1 AES256-SHA 4.94% 17.67% 17.89% 7.17% 16.41% 17.23% 17.25%
TABLE V. TOP PREFERRED CIPHER SUITES FOR TLSV1. (MINUS 3DES AND CAMELLIA)
2) Reuse of common primes for Diffie-Hellman: For SMTP
we found one 512 bit prime which is used by 996,792 distinct
IPs (64% of all 1,557,288 valid scans) and also one 1024
bit prime which is used by 1,077,736 distinct IPs (69.2%).
These two primes are statically included in the postfix source
code.10 We also rediscovered these primes (512 bit: 2,066
hosts, 1024 bit: 512,391 hosts) at DH handshakes on port 465.
1,673,271 distinct IPs on port 465 (58.7%) make use of the
specific DH group used by Exim11 as described above. On
port 587, 539,322 IPs (32.7%) use the 1024 bit and 212,898
IPs (12.9%) use the 512 bit prime used by postfix. 218,163
(13.2%) use the Exim 2048 bit group and 85,548 (5.2%) use
a 1024 bit prime included in the nginx source code12. 99,278
IPs on port 993 (2.38%) and 94,555 IPs on port 995 (2.4%)
use the same 1024 bit nginx prime. 512 bit primes are not
shared for these protocols. Only 721 IPs (IMAPS) and 733
10https://github.com/vdukhovni/postfix/blob/master/postfix/src/tls/tls dh.c
11https://github.com/Exim/exim/blob/master/src/src/std-crypto.c
12http://trac.nginx.org/nginx/browser/nginx/src/event/ngx event openssl.c
IPs (POP3S) share the most used 512 bit prime. Primes used
in server deployments for POP and IMAP are more diverse.
The most used 1024 bit prime is used by 27,429 IPs (POP)
and 6,291 IPs (IMAP), which are only 0.8% of all distinct IPs
each. The most commonly shared 512 bit prime is only used
by 0.05% of all IPs.
3) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman: One alternative is using
Diffie-Hellman key exchanges based on elliptic curve cryp-
tography. We examined common used curves specified for the
use in TLS [10]. For SMTP related protocols the secp256r1
curve is used for up to 99.2% of all ECDH handshakes. For
POP3 and IMAP ports the usage differs, as 3 different curves
are in use whereas secp384r1 is by far the most used curve.
Additionally, the curves sect163r2, secp224r1 and secp256k1
occur, but only for less than 0.03% of all handshakes.
D. TLS Certificates
The subject of certificate validation for HTTPS has been
investigated by various other studies [42], [25], [22]. In our
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Common Name (Issuer Common Name) Fingerprint Port IPs
*.nazwa.pl (nazwaSSL) b16c. . . 6e24 25 40,568
465 81,514
587 84,318
993 85,637
995 85,451
*.pair.com (USERTrust RSA Organization . . . ) a42d. . . 768f 25 15,573
110 60,588
143 13,186
465 63,248
587 61,933
993 64,682
995 64,763
*.home.pl (RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G3) 8a4f. . . 6932 110 126,174
143 26,735
587 125,075
.home.pl (AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2) c4db. . . a488 993 128,839
995 126,102
*.sakura.ne.jp (RapidSSL SHA256 CA - G3) 964b. . . c39e 25 16,573
*.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (Starfield . . . ) f336. . . ac57 993 61,307
995 61,250
TABLE XII. COMMON LEAF CERTIFICATES
study we analyzed 2,115,228 different unique leaf certificates
for all e-mail related protocols. We used certificates collected
with our cipher suite scans. For temporal analysis we addition-
ally used scans conducted by University of Michigan.
1) Self-signed certificates: We used the Mozilla NSS Trust-
store (as of 04/2015) to validate all certificates. For client-
to-server protocols the percentage of self-signed certificates
used is very high. Over 50% of all distinct IPs use self-signed
certificates, only 33–37% are correctly validated. For SMTP
the number of self-signed certificates is even higher. 65% of all
distinct IPs we scanned use a self-signed certificate (expired
self-signed certificates included). This is no surprise, since
SMTP deployments do not validate certificates by default.
Around 1% of all valid certificates are valid but expired. An
overview is given in Table X.
2) RSA public key size: We find that over 99% of all leaf
certificates use RSA public keys. We analyzed the public key
size of these certificates and find that over 90% of all trusted
leaf certificates are equipped with 2048 bit public keys. Less
than 10% use 4096 bit public keys and less than 0.1% use
1024 bit keys. This situation changes if we consider self-signed
certificates. 1024 bit keys are often used (15–40%), followed
by 2048 bit keys.
3) Common leaf certificates: Many certificates are found
on more than one IP. Table XII shows the number of IPs that
use the same certificate. The table includes the top certificates
per port. We identify certificates that are used by a massive
number of IPs, usually in same subnets. The certificate with
the SHA1 fingerprint b16c...6e24 was provided on 85,635
IPs in 2 different /16 IP ranges and on 2 IPs in two completely
different IP ranges.
We also found self-signed certificates that do not
share the same fingerprint, but subject attributes are the
same. (CommonName, OrganizationalUnitName,
OrganizationalName). We identify entities that are
responsible for a large number of self-signed certificates.
These entities are either software administration tools like
Parallels Panel or Plesk or default configurations of mail
software like Courier and Dovecot. They also play an
important role in reducing the use of self-signed certificates
Name Key Size IPs
Parallels Panel - Parallels 2048 306,852
imap.example.com - IMAP server 1024 261,741
Automatic. . . POP3 SSL key - Courier Mail Server 1024 87,246
Automatic. . . IMAP SSL key - Courier Mail Server 1024 83,976
Plesk - Parallels 2048 68,930
localhost.localdomain - SomeOrganizationalUnit 1024 26,248
localhost - Dovecot mail server 2048 13,134
plesk - Plesk - SWsoft, Inc. 2048 14,207
TABLE XIII. TOP SELF SIGNED CERTIFICIATES FOR ALL PROTOCOLS
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Fig. 3. SMTP leaf certificate volatility
in the future. An overview of top entitities is shown in
Table XIII.
4) Weak RSA Keys: Of 30,757,242 collected RSA certifi-
cates from all e-mail protocols and related ports we’ve ex-
tracted 2,354,090 unique RSA moduli and were able to recover
456 GCDs (hence RSA private keys). We used techniques and
tooling provided by the authors of [36] for computation of
vulnerable moduli. A similar analysis was performed on data-
sets for HTTPS in [22].
E. Certificate volatility
To analyse the change in certificate strength over time we
used the freely available datasets from scans.io. They cover
the last six months on bi-weekly granularity and are based on
scans of the entire IPv4 range. We extracted the size of the
RSA key of the leaf certificates and plotted them over time for
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Fig. 4. IMAP and POP3 leaf certificate volatility
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all important e-mail ports. Figure 4 shows the key distribution
of each port for STARTTLS-enabled client-to-server protocols.
While the majority uses 2048 bit strength leaf certificates, only
a small fraction uses the stronger 4096 bit size. They seem to
be rather stable over time, with a slight increase in the overall
number of 2048 bit keys. The key distribution for SMTP is
shown in Figure 3.
F. Domains
Our scans are based on IPv4 addresses. The responsible
mail server address for a specific domain is stored in MX
records of the domain name system. The influence of each
SMTP server deployment to the global state of TLS security
is not evenly distributed, because a single SMTP server can be
responsible for many domains and assigned to many different
public IP-addresses. We analyzed MX records for the domains
listed in the Alexa Top 1 Million ranking. Although this
ranking is based on web traffic, we can identify common used
SMTP servers. We checked 978,842 domains and resolved all
MX records to IPs. 12.35% of the domains had no MX record
at all. From the remaining 857,910 domains 16.01% used MX
records attributed to Google. secureserver.net was included in
4.10% and qq.com in 1.22% of all domains MX records. On
the contrary, 527,680 MX record names are only used by one
domain. This gives us a basic idea on how much some players
influence the global state of TLS security for SMTP.
Google started to publish statistics of encrypted e-mail
traffic as part of their transparency report [33]. They state
that 45% of inbound and 20% of outbound e-mail traffic from
Google is still unencrypted. Also, Twitter recently published
data stating that only 8% of their e-mail traffic is unencrypted.
These transparency reports are important sources of infor-
mation. Due to the decentralized infrastructure of the e-mail
transport system, we only get a very limited view of the global
state of encryption. More transparency reports would help to
clarify our view even more. To draw a total picture of SMTP
encryption and estimate changes in the usage of different
cipher suites we introduce a new approach in Section V.
G. Plaintext authentication
A commonly observed issue with e-mail are servers sup-
porting plaintext authentication without support for START-
TLS. Despite having nothing to do with cryptography per-se,
this is an important issue for transport security as connection
authentication data sent via plaintext channel provides an
easy target for any attacker. Further, AUTH-PLAIN should
only be offered after a connection has been upgraded via
STARTTLS. If a server offers plaintext authentication on a
plaintext connection, neither server nor user will notice if
STARTTLS stripping is performed and password data sent in
clear over the wire. Table XIV outlines the number of hosts
that offer AUTH-PLAIN and support STARTTLS but allow
plaintext authentication before an upgrade to TLS and hosts
that do not offer STARTTLS at all.
V. CIPHER ISLANDS
To simulate the consequences of changes in the configured
cipher suites between all SMTP servers we have built a
model to estimate given probabilities based on the data we
Port no STARTTLS STARTTLS Total Hosts
25 12.90% 24.21% 7,114,171
110 4.24% 63.86% 5,310,730
143 4.38% 66.97% 4,843,513
587 15.41% 42.80% 2,631,662
TABLE XIV. HOSTS THAT OFFER AUTH PLAIN
TLS version Probability
SSLv3, TLSv1 41.63%
SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 16.10%
TLSv1 14.75%
Plaintext 10.88%
TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 8.82%
SSLv3 3.42%
TLSv1.2 2.07%
TABLE XV. CIPHER SUITES IN THE SMTP DATASET
collected. This was done to calculate the impact in percent
that two random servers are able to communicate using TLS
if certain cipher suites are allowed or prohibited. We assume
that it is equally likely that a random SMTP relay has the
objective to transmit an e-mail for any of the others for the
sake of brevity (which is clearly not the case). Since these
connections can go unrestrictively in both directions – i.e.
server X can send a message to any server Y and vice versa
– our model still gives useful insights into the consequences
of TLS cipher hardening and the estimated use of TLS
for specific scenarios as outlined below. To calculate the
probabilities we built a weighted graph where the nodes are
representing the unique combinations of cipher suites, in total
roughly 90,000. The nodes were weighted with the number of
SMTP servers that have that specific cipher suite configured.
Edges were assigned between two nodes if they share at least
one common cipher suite. Table XV shows the initial table
from the entire set of SMTP servers on port 25 we collected.
The list is sorted by percentage and shows that the likelihood
for any two servers chosen at random to use a cipher suite in
TLS version SSLv3 or TLSv1 is 41%. In one out of ten cases
the servers are unable to agree on a mutual cipher suite, and
e-mail will be transmitted in plaintext. Please note that the
actual calculations were conducted on each supported cipher
suite, and probabilities are only presented in the aggregated
TLS version. Probabilities of less than 1% have been dropped
from the table.
Simply changing the cipher suites of a specific server can
render large percentages of other SMTP servers unreachable,
as they can no longer negotiate a bilateral usable TLS
cipher suite. Since the fallback in SMTP is to transmit the
e-mail in plaintext if there is no agreement on a shared
cipher suite, this is clearly undesirable. Assuming that
a considerate administrator changes the cipher suites of
her e-mail server according to the recommendations from
either bettercrypto.org [1] (all A-ranked cipher suites) or
RFC7525 [40]. Since the results for both recommendations are
extremely similar, the consequences can be seen in Table XVI.
It can be seen that more than half of all SMTP servers that
support TLS become unreachable as a consequence.
With the recent discussions whether RC4 is still a secure
cipher [57] for use in transport security, we also simulated
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Cipher suite Probability
Plaintext 52.80%
TLS ECDHE RSA AES256 SHA384 18.47%
TLS DHE RSA AES256 SHA256 11.61%
TLS ECDHE RSA AES256 GCM SHA384 10.59%
TLS DHE RSA AES256 GCM SHA384 6.53%
TABLE XVI. CIPHER SUITES WITH SMTP COMPARED TO
BETTERCRYPTO
TLS version Probability
SSLv3, TLSv1 40.56%
SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 16.31%
TLSv1 14.41%
Plaintext 11.44%
TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 9.04%
SSLv3 2.99%
TLSv1.2 2.41%
SSLv3, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 1.10%
TABLE XVII. CIPHER SUITES WITHOUT RC4 IN SMTP
what happens if RC4 is no longer used in any TLS version.
The results can be seen in Table XVII. As it can be seen the
probabilities do not drastically change compared to the initial
Table XV. About one in ten e-mails would still be transmitted
in plain, but the other supported cipher suites substitute the
lack of RC4 quite well.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results from our scans cast a poor light on the use
of TLS in e-mail. Not only are weak encryption mechanism
and cipher suites like export grade ciphers supported by a
non-negligible fraction of e-mail servers, we also found that
the recent increase in HTTPS certificate security (moving
certificates from 1024 to 2048 bit) went totally unnoticed for
all e-mail related ports, IPv4-wide. Furthermore, millions of
hosts are currently misconfigured to allow AUTH-PLAIN over
unencrypted connections resulting in the risk of transmitting
user credentials unencrypted. Even if each of these systems
has only one user, this leaves close to 20 million users
vulnerable to attack.
Using our model we showed that increasing the cipher
suites to the current acceptable level of security would
prevent communicating with 50% of all e-mail servers that
support and use TLS, since they are no longer reachable over
bilaterally supported TLS. This means that the movement to
more secure configurations needs to be done on a larger scale,
protecting one server alone is insufficient. Administrators
should be encouraged to check with which e-mail servers
their systems interact regularly, and adapt their security
accordingly. We also showed that the entire e-mail ecosystem
as a whole is not dependent on RC4 nor SSLv2 nor SSLv3
alone: disabling them comes with minimal impact, and should
be considered for the near-term future.
We found that more than 650,000 SMTP deployments
accept export grade ciphers with TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 (with
at least OpenSSL is affected, implementation-wise) although
this behaviour is explicitly forbidden (MUST NOT) in RFC
4346 [17].
We also found troublesome issues despite the cryptographic
primitives used (if any at all). More than half of all certificates
we observed were self-signed, meaning that an active attacker
could exchange the certificate in a man-in-the-middle
scenario [43]. Since the user interface of most e-mail clients
lack a convenient way to check the authenticity of certificates,
this leaves clients without the most simple protection
mechansims – which are well-deployed and well understood
for the HTTPS PKIX ecosystem.
Compared to previous work on HTTPS [25], [22] we
did not analyze the certificate authorities who issued the
certificates at length. For one, we found that a very large
percentage of certificates in e-mail protocols are self-signed.
Secondly, while HTTPS enables the client to authenticate the
final server serving the content, this is different for e-mail
due to the distributed nature of e-mail transmission protocols.
Only the first hop is observable to the client, and thus only
a fraction of servers along the path of an e-mail. Lastly, we
find this to be rather a policy issue, i.e. who is trusted by the
software vendors as certificate authority, then a trust issue, i.e.
do I trust CA X to issue certificates for a given domain Y [60].
Furthermore, there are now effective countermeasures available
for HTTPS which are transparent for users like HPKP [27] for
dynamic public key pinning or certificate pinning within the
browser to effectively prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. No
such mechanisms exist so far for e-mail protocols and server
implementations, and as such we purposely didn’t evaluate the
issuing certificate authorities. However, we will release our
data sets and the collected certificates for readers who are
interested in this analysis.
A. Who leads the way?
The overall security of the e-mail ecosystem cannot
be improved by a single actor. Overall security in e-mail
transmission can only improve slowly if the majority of
transmitting hosts aligns. We identified multiple issues that
need to change not only in the long-term, but already in
the near-term future. We found that big providers of e-mail
infrastructure often lead the way regarding TLS in e-mail.
For one, the usage of TLS in e-mail has increased since the
documents by Edward Snowden on NSA dragnet surveillance
were published, with Yahoo and Microsoft live.com enabling
their server infrastructure to enforce TLS wherever possible.
Secondly, big service providers like Gmail are in the position
to give deep insight into the server-to-server use of TLS.
With the release of more and more transparency reports (most
recently by Twitter), we can draw a more complete picture of
TLS use and identify global actors that handle large volume
of e-mail and do not support TLS. Based on this data it
would be great to have a list of the most important domains
regarding legit e-mail volume, similar to the often-cited Alexa
list of popular websites.
There will always be space for niche providers like hush-
mail, riseup.net, or the German Posteo that focus their busi-
ness model around security and privacy. They target specific
privacy-aware users and implement additional security features
like DNSSEC, DANE, DKIM, SPF and more. However, with
free e-mail giants like live.com, Google, Yahoo and others
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that have a business model around targeted advertisement
depending on the content of their customers e-mails, they still
have an implicit responsibility to protect their customers at
least by using and enforcing TLS for e-mail wherever possible
(and increasingly do so).
B. Limitations
Since there is no comprehensive list and global ranking
of e-mail domains regarding their e-mail volume and overall
popularity, this is a clear drawback of our approach. We
treated and weighted all scanned IPs equally. Major e-mail
provider that handle an overproportional volume of clients are
treated equally to the single-user, single-domain self-hosted
server. However, we tried to counter this form of bias in our
observations and findings by using for one the most popular
e-mail related domains as published by Google, as well as
correlate it with the most popular websites, even though there
seems to be no direct correlation between popular websites and
popular e-mail domains. A full list of popular SMTP hosts
would have been very helpful, but without any data openly
available we had to resort to unweighted statistical analysis.
Another limitation is that our findings are only showing a
point-in-time snapshot and as such are only of short-living
value.
C. Future Work
For future work we intend to keep our scans actively
running and will keep publishing their results as the volatility
in cipher configurations and certificates demands regular scan
intervals. Long-term trends and reaction times to security
incidents like Heartbleed [23] or the weak certificates issued
with Debian’s faulty PRNG [62] back in 2008 are still not
fully understood, and data is needed to show the improvements
of technical mechanisms to enhance the security in e-mail
as well as the awareness of e-mail server administrators.
We also plan to keep improving our scanning infrastructure,
to allow for long-term data collection and to provide open
data for analysis. Additionally, we plan to present our results
interactively, on a website which also incorporates existing
TLS recommendations.
Another aspect we would like to investigate is the issue
of fingerprinting: based on the data we collected, how reliable
is a software version identifyable just by inspecting the TLS
configuration in use. This would include cipher parameters like
primes and Diffie-Hellman group in use, as well as default
configurations of supported cipher suites.
VII. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Various approaches are technically feasible to increase
the security of TLS in e-mail, despite trying to increase the
TLS configuration of each and every individual server. The
most important issue however is in our opinion to increase
the awareness for security and secure configurations among
administrators. Furthermore, mitigation can be put into two
different categories. For one, various forms of pinning could
be used (either on the host itself or on the network layer) as
the certificate information is transmitted prior to the encrypted
communication and the number of e-mails transmitted to
particular servers is usually much larger compared to the
number of its certificate changes. Tack.io13 is a draft from
2013 which could be used to add trust assertions to certificates
and would be especially valuable to protocols making use of
STARTTLS.
The second class of defenses includes all methods
where signed certificates are transmitted over additional
communication channels, most notably DNSSEC or
DANE [39]. Both rely on including signed assurances
in DNS name records that can be verified by the client to not
have been manipulated on the path of communication. Notary
services like ICSI Certificate Notary [5], Convergence14 or
the SSL Observatory from the EFF are just a few examples
of readily-available and deployed approaches where the trust
is distributed among independent entities. Defending against
active attackers is much harder however, as the attacker is
always in the position to suppress communication like the
STARTTLS command at the beginning of the transmission.
Such stripping attacks can only be prevented if there is
no fallback mechanism to plaintext, which is currently
unfortunately the default between MTAs. In IETF a new draft
is being worked on called DEEP (“Deployable Enhanced
Email Privacy”)15. If standardized and implemented it would
offer extensions to SMTP, POP3 and IMAP for so-called
“latches” which are similar to what HSTS [37] does for
HTTP, follow-up connections will use the same or better
security parameters as previous transactions with a given
server. The extensions also offer mail user agents (MUA) the
possibility to indicate security levels to end-users.
Lastly, operators of smaller e-mail servers often do not
change default configurations. They should be incentivized to
enable important security primitives, or enforcing TLS for
communication. Guidelines to improve security for various
software products exist [1], [40], [54], but these suggestions
are not automatically implemented. If software products embed
secure configurations by default, this could change the overall
primitives in TLS usage. Smart update mechanisms could
enforce, or at least offer, the use of stronger cryptographic
primitives. A promising project for exterminating the usage of
self-signed certificates is the project Let’s encrypt16 which will
become a fully automatic CA to issue trusted certificates for
free.
VIII. RELATED WORK
1) Large-scale Scanning: In 2008 Heidemann et al. [35]
started an Internet wide discovery scan of edge hosts. They
were the first to census the IPv4 address space, but were
limited to host discovery, not containing protocol or service
specific results. First projects to cover TLS related scanning
included the EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) Observa-
tory [25], [26] which collected 1.3 million unique certificates
of the HTTPS / TLS public key infrastructure. Holz et al. [42]
verified flaws in the PKI of TLS with a larger data set obtained
by using nmap on the Alexa Top 1 Million pages as well as
13https://tack.io
14https://convergence.io
15https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-email-deep
16https://letsencrypt.org/
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passive scan data. Amann et al. [6] revisited SSL and X.509
deployments in 2012 with passively collected data. In 2013
Durumeric et al. developed zmap, a tool for fast Internet-
wide scanning [24]. This resulted in the HTTPS ecosystem
study [22], on certificates and certificate authorities, having a
nearly complete dataset. These studies are the inspiration for
our work, but primarily focused on the public key infrastruc-
ture of HTTPS. Unlike our study, detailed cipher suite scans
were not conducted. The results of port scans originated from
University of Michigan were used as input data for our scan.
2) Evaluating HTTPS: In 2007 Lee et al. [48] surveyed
19,000 TLS enabled servers and inspected the supported TLS
versions and different cryptographic primitves for HTTPS
servers. Several newer studies for different deployed secu-
rity mechanisms exist. Huang et al. [44] surveyed forward
secrecy parameters and measured latencies of different cipher
suites, Kranch and Bonneau [47] conducted a study of HTTP
Strict Transport Security and public key pinning deployments.
Weissbacher et al. [61] analyzed the adoption of CSP (Content
Security Policy). These datasets are all limited to the Alexa Top
1 Million ranking and, especially in case of CSP and HSTS,
not relevant for e-mail security. The acceptance of cipher
suites which support forward secrecy is analyzed in our study.
Heninger et al. [36] performed Internet wide scans to identify
vulnerable RSA and DSA keys. Due to entropy problems of
the random number generators used, they were able to obtain
0.5% of all RSA private keys for HTTPS. We revisited their
work and analyzed RSA public keys used in TLS over e-mail
related protocols. Zhang et al. [63] used one scan of the HTTPS
ecosystem scans to find untrusted certificates. These certificates
were used as a metric, among others, to find a relationship
between misconfiguration and malicious activity of networks.
Adrian et al. [2] investigated the security of Diffie-Hellman
key exchanges using an Alexa Top 1 Million scan. This
scan was also performed for HTTPS, not considering the e-
mail ecosystem. We investigated common primes and Diffie-
Hellman parameters, as well as usage statistics on elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman exchanges for the e-mail ecosystem.
3) Scan Detection: Dainotti et al. [15] measured the impact
of a coordinated Internet wide scan using the UCSD network
telescope, a /8 darknet receiving unsolicited traffic. Also Du-
rumeric et al. [21] observed Internet-wide scanning activity,
identified patterns and analyzed defensive behaviour.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed and evaluated a scalable approach
to assess the overall security in e-mail protocols by inspecting
the underlying TLS primitives. We evaluated our methodology
on all different ports in use for e-mail by actively scanning
the entire range of IPv4. We conducted more then 10 billion
TLS handshakes and discovered multiple flaws that prevent
the use of TLS as effective countermeasure against passive
attackers. Overall, the state of TLS in e-mail transmission
is, unsurprisingly, worse than compared to HTTPS, as 15–
30% of all servers accept weak export grade ciphers, and the
majority of certificates is self-signed. On the positive side
we were able to show that RC4 and the use of SSLv2 and
SSLv3 for backward compatibility can be considered almost
obsolete. Disabling them has hardly any negative impact on
the total number of reachable SMTP servers according to our
calculations.
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25 110 143 465 587 993 995
RSA 92.3% 99.1% 99.0% 95.0% 93.0% 99.1% 99.0%
DHE-RSA 85.9% 74.8% 74.7% 86.4% 65.0% 73.9% 73.7%
ECDHE-RSA 41.2% 8.4% 8.7% 11.5% 25.2% 8.9% 7.2%
ADH 64.3% 7.8% 6.3% 14.5% 26.0% 5.3% 5.5%
AECDH 35.9% 1.7% 1.7% 7.3% 14.5% 1.7% 1.6%
EXP-RSA 75.2% 18.1% 16.5% 5.8% 28.9% 15.7% 16.1%
EXP-DHE-RSA 71.6% 11.8% 10.3% 3.6% 18.7% 9.2% 9.4%
EXP-ADH 63.2% 7.5% 6.0% 0.1% 12.8% 5.0% 5.2%
Only RSA 2.7% 15.9% 16.2% 6.2% 14.5% 17.1% 17.4%
TABLE VI. KEY EXCHANGE METHOD SUPPORT
Encryption algorithm 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
AES-128 (CBC) 91.3% 93.5% 94.0% 93.5% 84.3% 92.2% 91.3%
AES-256 (CBC) 91.6% 93.4% 93.8% 93.9% 84.5% 93.4% 92.5%
3DES-168 91.6% 97.4% 97.5% 93.3% 92.3% 96.2% 96.3%
RC4-128 86.3% 86.5% 85.7% 82.3% 79.6% 83.4% 83.7%
CAMELLIA-256 58.8% 55.9% 57.8% 66.0% 51.3% 58.2% 56.5%
CAMELLIA-128 58.7% 55.9% 57.8% 66.0% 51.3% 58.5% 56.9%
AES-128 (GCM) 54.9% 49.3% 52.8% 63.3% 46.4% 55.2% 53.4%
AES-256 (GCM) 55.4% 49.2% 52.7% 63.0% 46.6% 55.1% 53.0%
SEED-128 53.8% 48.6% 50.0% 52.8% 35.8% 49.1% 47.9%
IDEA-128 21.6% 45.9% 46.5% 46.3% 28.4% 45.8% 45.9%
DES-56 76.1% 5.8% 5.6% 6.8% 29.8% 6.5% 6.8%
RC4-40 74.9% 18.1% 16.5% 5.8% 28.8% 15.4% 15.7%
RC2-40 74.9% 17.9% 16.3% 5.8% 28.7% 15.3% 15.6%
DES-40 73.6% 17.7% 16.2% 5.2% 28.1% 14.7% 14.8%
RC2-128 40.9% 2.7% 2.2% 4.1% 14.4% 5.6% 6.3%
NULL 0.1% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.04%
Only AES-CBC 0.16% 0.11% 0.07% 0.06% 0.11% 0.22% 0.37%
Only RC4 0.05% 0.45% 0.45% 0.87% 0.10% 0.78% 0.80%
TABLE VII. ENCRYPTION METHOD SUPPORT
cipher suites Size of Prime 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
Export 512 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Non-Export 512 0.08% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.07% 0.05%
Non-Export 768 0.02% 6.31% 6.52% 0.00% 0.03% 7.02% 7.43%
Non-Export 1024 99.10% 92.11% 91.64% 30.39% 75.39% 92.14% 91.77%
Non-Export 2048 0.79% 1.50% 1.75% 69.50% 24.48% 0.71% 0.70%
Non-Export 4096 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00%
TABLE VIII. DH PARAMETER SIZE
DH Curve 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
secp256r1 99.20% 27.67% 25.52% 99.73% 94.63% 28.77% 23.26%
secp384r1 0.22% 65.70% 67.35% 0.10% 3.84% 63.82% 69.65%
secp521r1 0.12% 0.94% 1.01% 0.12% 0.93% 1.02% 0.93%
sect571r1 0.46% 5.69% 6.13% 0.02% 0.59% 6.38% 6.13%
TABLE IX. PERCENTAGE OF DIFFERENT ELLIPTIC CURVES USED
Result of Validation 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
ok 20.66% 32.87% 34.11% 36.20% 37.57% 35.81% 37.43%
self-signed certificate 65.20% 52.13% 53.05% 53.96% 38.61% 51.57% 50.03%
unable to get local issuer certificate 10.05% 11.31% 11.01% 8.30% 20.50% 11.09% 11.19%
validation error 1.24% 2.49% 0.53% 0.24% 0.99% 0.07% 0.08%
certificate has expired 0.98% 0.77% 0.81% 0.75% 1.26% 0.86% 0.80%
TABLE X. TRUSTSTORE RESULTS FOR ALL DISTINCT IPS IN MOZILLA NSS TRUSTSTORE
RSA Public Key Size 25 110 143 465 587 993 995
All Certificates
512 0.29% 0.13% 0.13% 0.06% 0.10% 0.10% 0.05%
1024 19.97% 17.57% 16.37% 9.85% 19.01% 16.27% 15.29%
2048 75.74% 79.49% 80.45% 86.68% 76.75% 80.28% 81.58%
4096 3.78% 2.72% 2.96% 3.34% 4.02% 3.27% 3.00%
Trusted Leaf Certificates (OK)
1024 0.06% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
2048 92.59% 94.61% 94.34% 93.54% 93.73% 93.93% 94.35%
4096 7.24% 5.34% 5.60% 6.40% 6.18% 5.99% 5.58%
Self Signed Certificates
512 0.17% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04%
1024 23.14% 30.28% 28.26% 14.06% 39.32% 28.26% 27.62%
2048 74.17% 68.45% 70.38% 84.67% 57.82% 70.30% 71.10%
4096 2.26% 1.11% 1.19% 1.14% 2.58% 1.29% 1.12%
TABLE XI. RSA PUBLIC KEY SIZE
13
